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Abstract
The paper examines the determinants of the diffusion of state lotteries as a process of 
policy innovation. After more than 100 years of prohibition, U.S. states began to es-
tablish lotteries in the 1960s. The article uses statistical event history analysis to show 
that the adoption and diffusion of state lotteries depends on fiscal, political, and re-
gional factors of competition as well as on normative factors of social legitimization. 
The article develops two further arguments, first by discussing an advanced model of 
regional diffusion that views the regional effect as being dependent on the ideological-
institutional context and second by analyzing time dynamics in the diffusion process 
to show how initial explanatory factors change over time. In general, the findings point 
to the institutional environment as a factor influencing the diffusion of organizations.
Zusammenfassung
Der Aufsatz beschäftigt sich mit den Determinanten der Diffusion staatlicher Lotterien 
als Beispiel einer politischen Innovation. Nach einer Verbotszeit von mehr als einhun-
dert Jahren führten US-Bundesstaaten Lotterien ab den 1960er-Jahren schrittweise wie-
der ein. Anhand von statistischen Ereignisdatenanalysen zeigt der Beitrag, dass der Dif-
fusionsprozess von fiskalischen, politischen und regionalen Faktoren ebenso wie von 
normativen Faktoren der sozialen Legitimierung abhängt. Der Aufsatz stellt zwei weitere 
Aspekte heraus, die empirisch demonstriert werden: Zum einen wird ein erweitertes re-
gionales Diffusionsmodell diskutiert, das die räumliche Ausbreitung in Abhängigkeit zur 
ideologischen Struktur angrenzender Staaten erfasst; zum anderen wird die zeitliche Dy-
namik des Prozesses modelliert. Hierfür ist der soziologische Neo-Institutionalismus der 
theoretische Bezugspunkt, und es wird angenommen, dass mit zunehmender Dauer des 
Diffusionsprozesses die ursprünglichen Kausalfaktoren ihre Erklärungskraft zugunsten 
eines Bedeutungsgewinns von Legitimitätsaspekten verlieren. Die Ergebnisse dokumen-
tieren isomorphische Adaptionsprozesse und in organisationsökologischer Hinsicht die 
Bedeutung institutioneller Umwelten für die Ausbreitung von Organisationen.
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The Adoption of Lotteries in the United States, 1964–2007:  
A Model of Conditional and Time-Dynamical Diffusion
1 Introduction
Research on the diffusion of innovations between individuals, networks, organizations, 
societies, and states has been a vibrant area in the social sciences (Dobbin/Simmons/
Garrett 2007; Djelic 2008; Strang/Soule 1998; Rogers 2003). The diffusion of innova-
tions refers to the spread of abstract ideas and concepts as well as practices, structures, 
and organizations within social systems. Diffusion studies play an important role, par-
ticularly in the fields of economic sociology and organizational sciences. Such studies 
include those that deal with the rise of CFOs (Zorn 2004), the spreading of the multidi-
visional firm (Fligstein 1985), the causes of corporate downsizing (Budros 2004), or the 
diffusion of small, specialized players in markets (Carroll/Swaminathan 2000).
Using event history modeling on data for U.S. states for the period from 1964 to 2007, 
this paper examines the diffusion of a certain organizational form: state lotteries. With 
a few exceptions, lotteries were banned in the Western world for a period of more than 
100 years starting in the mid-nineteenth century. In the United States, they continued 
to be prohibited until the middle third of the twentieth century. The ban was gradually 
removed when several U.S. states introduced lotteries as state-run events. New Hamp-
shire was the first to introduce a state lottery in 1964, followed by New York in 1967 and 
New Jersey in 1970. Almost every consecutive year after this, other states began to estab-
lish their own lottery. By 1975, thirteen states had a state lottery; in the mid–1980s this 
expanded to twenty; the mid–1990s saw a total of thirty-six states with a state lottery; 
and when North Carolina joined these ranks in 2006, the total number of states running 
a lottery reached forty-two. Lotteries continue to be prohibited in the remaining states. 
For states operating a lottery, they form an important source of fiscal revenue. Why are 
they still prohibited in some states? What factors explain their diffusion?
The present study follows up on a classic diffusion study by Berry and Berry (1990) on 
the adoption of U.S. state lotteries. From this and other studies, we can distinguish be-
tween four approaches that explain the diffusion process: (1) economic causes, (2) politi-
cal factors, (3) social conditions of the normative legitimacy of gambling, and (4) factors 
of tax competition and the regional influence of neighboring state lotteries. In general, 
these four approaches also explain diffusion processes for other policy innovations, such 
as political reforms, new laws, or the adoption of new taxes (Berry 1988; Walker 1969). 
I thank Juan J. Fernández, Lothar Krempel, and Jan Sauermann for helpful comments. Versions of 
the paper were presented at the 22nd Annual Meeting of the Society for the Advancement of Socio-
Economics (SASE), Philadelphia 2010, and the 35th Congress of the German Society for Sociology 
(DGS), Frankfurt 2010.
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This study examines these approaches on the basis of recent data and adds two further 
aspects. The first involves the use of a model of conditional diffusion based on Martin 
(2009a, 2009b). It will be argued that processes of regional policy diffusion can be bet-
ter explained if we account for differences in the government ideology of the adopting 
states. A regional influence by neighboring states on policy adoption is especially strong 
when it interacts with an ideological environment that intensifies the neighborhood 
effect. In demonstrating this effect empirically through modeling interaction effects 
between regional and ideological factors, this paper will contribute to the present litera-
ture on the effects of regional policy diffusion.
The second aspect relates to changes over time in the explanation of the diffusion process. 
Drawing on the literature on convergence and isomorphism of the new sociological in-
stitutionalism and on organizational ecology (Scott 1995; Hannan/Freeman 1993; Pow-
ell/DiMaggio 1991), the paper analyzes how lotteries have come to be taken for granted 
over the course of time. It shows that the factors driving the adoption of lotteries are 
becoming increasingly independent of the early factors that drove the initial adoption 
and diffusion. Therefore, with an increasing duration of the diffusion process, lotteries 
have become a legitimate organization. Jensen (2003) attempted to demonstrate this by 
analyzing how causal factors change over different time periods. The approach presented 
here is more sophisticated because it uses interaction models. The models demonstrate 
how and with what statistical precision the effects in explaining the diffusion process 
change over time with increasing exposure to the diffusion process itself. 
With these explanations, the paper provides a more complex approach to the under-
standing of the adoption and diffusion of state lotteries as a political and organiza-
tional innovation. Furthermore, this study expands the diffusion literature to include 
two additional aspects that can be seen as important explanatory factors of diffusion 
processes per se. The interdependence between regional diffusion effects and political 
ideology as well as the changing influence of initial introductory factors over the course 
of time demonstrates the role that institutional factors play in explaining the spread of 
organizational forms. The diffusion of legitimate organizations is a central focus in in-
stitutional theory. Within this research, the increased legitimation of an organizational 
form is traced back to an increase in the number of that form (Carroll 1985; Carroll/
Swaminathan 2000). The diffusion model in this paper addresses this literature, as it 
demonstrates how the diffusion of a legitimate form is dependent on the local institu-
tional context that enables or prevents diffusion. In addition, it illustrates which initial 
diffusion factors are displaced by the growth of a legitimate order. 
In the following section, the article describes the history of the adoption process of state 
lotteries in the United States and presents basic information on their structure and or-
ganization. Section three provides a discussion of the state of research on the diffusion 
of lotteries as a policy innovation. From this, hypotheses will be derived which will be 
empirically tested in the ensuing section. The final section summarizes the main find-
ings of the study.  
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2 The reintroduction and spread of state lotteries in  
the United States since 1964 
The diffusion of the reintroduction of lotteries in the United States demonstrates a 
clear pattern. States in the Northeast were the first to adopt lotteries as state monopolies 
in the 1960s and 1970s, a development that spread to neighboring states, then to the 
central and western states, and finally to the Southwest (see Figure 1). By 1975, 26 per-
cent of all U.S. states, covering approximately 35 percent of the entire population, had 
introduced a state lottery. In the mid–1980s, approximately 40 percent of all states ran 
a lottery, providing about 54 percent of the population with access to one. By the mid–
1990s, thirty-six out of fifty states were operating a lottery. With the introduction of a 
state lottery in North Carolina in 2006, the total reached forty-two, meaning that more 
than 90 percent of the U.S. population lived in a lottery state.
The diffusion process can be divided into three phases (Blakey 1979). The first phase 
refers to the introduction in New Hampshire and New York in 1964 and 1967, respec-
tively. These first two lotteries were only moderately successful, and the gaming scheme 
was relatively unattractive. In New Hampshire, the lottery consisted of semi-annual 
draws based on horse racing results (Rosecrance 1988: 45). Without having to fear 
competition, both states initiated their lotteries on a “take it or leave it” basis (Blakey 
1979); there was neither effective marketing nor any efficient organization. The lack 
of competition made it simply irrelevant to optimize the organization of the lottery 
business. The second phase begins with the introduction of the lottery in New Jersey in 
1970. New Jersey established a more customer-friendly lottery, which initially featured 
monthly drawings, followed later by weekly draws. This meant that New Hampshire 
Figure 1 The Diffusion of U.S. Lotteries, 1964–2007
Source: La Fleur/La Fleur (2006); own compilation using the module ”spmap“ from STATA 
(see: http://www.stata.com/support/faqs/graphics/ spmap.html).
1964–1973
1974–1985
1986–1989
1990–2007
no lottery
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and New York experienced direct competition, which became evident in revenue losses. 
Competition was aggravated as more states in the Northeast adopted a lottery from 
1972 onwards. The third phase is characterized by intensified marketing and efforts 
to increase revenues. New variants of the game were introduced, such as the appear-
ance in the mid–1980s of lotto, a more attractive game scheme enabling players to pick 
their own numbers. The first lotteries were passive forms where players bought tickets 
with a pre-defined number (numbers game). The game of lotto was already a successful 
scheme in Europe and soon became the main factor in the U.S. lottery market. In 1985, 
it accounted for 40 percent of total sales (Mikesell 1990: 316). Lottery operators made 
use of the jackpot system in order to increase payouts and the popularity of the game 
(Hansen 2007: 5). They started to merge into a multistate lottery system, which is now 
known as Powerball. This game offers mega-jackpots that regularly amount to several 
hundred million dollars. 
With their growing popularity and increase in sales, lotteries produced revenues that the 
states increasingly began to rely on (Blakey 1979: 80). Revenues were no longer regarded 
as a welcome surplus for the state treasury but as a constant item in the budget. Lottery 
revenues became a significant source of fiscal revenue. In the fiscal year of 2005, revenues 
from lotteries totaled $47 billion, of which approximately $16 billion went towards state 
budgets (La Fleur/La Fleur 2006: 249). This sum equals around 0.15 percent of the state’s 
gross state product. Revenues from lotteries are approximately 110-times higher than the 
total of tax revenues from tobacco sales.1 Nevertheless, eight states still outlaw lotteries. 
Why do lotteries remain banned there despite their fiscal importance? Which factors 
have determined the diffusion of lotteries in the United States from 1964 to the present?
3 Explaining the diffusion of lotteries 
Diffusion processes in all kinds of empirical areas have been generally described as a non-
monotonic, bell-shaped “Gaussian” curve, where the y-axis is the number of adopters and 
the x-axis represents the length of the process (Rogers 2003; Diekmann 1989; Granovetter 
1978). This unimodal frequency distribution corresponds to a typically S-shaped cumu-
lative distribution: at the beginning of the process, there is only a small group of “radical” 
innovators who proceed to adopt an innovation. These innovators act under uncertain 
conditions because no prior model of the innovation exists, and therefore there is no 
information as to whether it will be successful or not. Inspired by the first innovators, a 
group of early adopters follow. These initial adopters pave the way for the masses: adop-
tion rates increase rapidly at this point. Finally, after the innovation is adopted by the 
majority of the population, a small number of laggards follow at a relatively slow pace.
1 Tax revenues from cigarette sales make up around 0.00133 percent of the gross state product for 
all states (Martin 2009a). 
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In order to explain the diffusion of political and organizational innovations, external 
and internal conditions have been discussed as causal factors driving the process (Berry 
1988). With regard to policy innovations, economic factors, as well as political and so-
cial conditions of a state, are usually referred to as internal factors. External factors refer 
to conditions outside of the adopting state, usually regional diffusion effects, which can 
be conditions of neighboring states that influence the adoption of a political innovation 
or the structural position of a state within a network of others. 
In addition, according to the sociological neoinstitutionalism literature, the mecha-
nisms of diffusion can be perceived as a process that structurally homogenizes orga-
nizational forms (Powell/DiMaggio 1991; Scott 1995; Jensen 2003; Zucker 1987, 1977; 
Meyer/Rowan 1977). Several studies interpret diffusion processes in conjunction with 
sociological neoinstitutionalism, such as the Neil Fligstein study on the spread of mana-
gerial capitalism (Fligstein 1990) or Tolbert und Zucker (1983) on civil service reforms 
(see also Boxenbaum/Jonsson 2008: 83ff.). 
In order to explain the diffusion of lotteries, four approaches have been discussed in the 
literature. Firstly, economic factors play a role, in particular on the fiscal situation of the 
adopting state (Jackson/Saurman/Shughart 1994; Furlong 1998; Alm/McKee/Skidmore 
1993; Berry/Berry 1990; Filer/Moak/Uze 1988). Secondly, political factors impact the 
diffusion of lotteries, such as the party holding the majority in the respective state (Fur-
long 1998: 372; Filer/Moak/Uze 1988; Jackson/Saurman/Shughart 1994; Martin/Yandle 
1990). Thirdly, social values affect the normative approval or disapproval of gambling 
(Ellison/Nybroten 1999; Olson/Guth/Guth 2003). In particular, religious values, such 
as those found in Protestantism, morally reject any form of gambling. Therefore, states 
with a higher proportion of conservative Protestants are more likely to oppose the intro-
duction of a state lottery. Fourthly, regional diffusion effects play a role. Lotteries diffuse 
via neighborhood states (Mikesell 1989, 1990; Mikesell/Zorn 1986; Wohlenberg 1992). 
The adoption of a lottery creates tax competition between bordering states, which leads 
to increased pressure on each state to introduce a lottery. However, as will be demon-
strated here, this regional diffusion effect varies in conjunction with the government 
ideology of a state. The effect should be especially strong if the pressure caused by the 
existence of neighborhood lotteries meets an ideological base advocating the adoption 
of a lottery. A weak effect ensues if it is faced with an ideology that opposes the adoption 
of a lottery (Martin 2009a). 
In addition, with the new sociological institutionalism and organizational ecology lit-
erature (Scott 1995; Hannan/Freeman 1993), it will be argued that lotteries become a 
legitimate organization as the number of newly established lotteries increases over the 
course of time. Therefore, a significant change in the effects explaining the diffusion 
process over time should arise. Factors that initially resulted in the adoption of a lottery 
in the early periods, such as the fiscal situation of a state, should no longer have an effect 
on the later stages of the diffusion process. The reason for this is that lotteries have be-
come a socially accepted organization and are now taken for granted. The spread of lot-
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teries corresponds to the spread of a gradual legitimization process of the innovation. 
Therefore, lotteries are no longer adopted because of concrete fiscal or political matters, 
but because they are now culturally legitimate. In the next section, these approaches will 
be discussed in more detail and hypotheses will be derived.
(Fiscal) Economic factors: State lotteries to cover revenue
The first approach justifies the introduction of lotteries within the budgetary position 
of each state. Lotteries provide a means to generate government revenue. If a state expe-
riences increased fiscal requirements, the implementation of lotteries is probable (Jack-
son/Saurman/Shughart 1994; Furlong 1998; Berry/Berry 1990; Filer/Moak/Uze 1988). 
Generally, it has been demonstrated that states with budget deficits tend to seek new 
tax revenue sources or further exploit existing taxes by increasing them (Hansen 1983). 
The significance of fiscal motives in adopting lotteries is rather clear if one looks at the 
history of lotteries (Blanche 1950). Until the first third of the nineteenth century, count-
less public facilities such as orphanages, churches, gates, lighthouses, bridges, ports, ca-
nals, roads, town halls, and public places were financed through lotteries. Lottery rev-
enue also funded schools and libraries. The establishment of some of the most pres-
tigious American universities, including Harvard, Yale, Dartmouth, Williams, Brown, 
Princeton, Columbia, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania, were financially supported by 
specifically organized lottery events. The sponsors of these lotteries were initially pri-
vate investors and later included cities or municipalities, schools or other public bodies, 
as well as the states. By 1750, all lotteries were under state control, and it was illegal to 
hold private lotteries without a relevant permit. The prohibition of private lotteries 
strengthened their fiscal character: a greater competition between many private indi-
vidual lotteries would have resulted in the reduction of government revenue generated 
by them.
Does this also apply to the twentieth century, in which modern systems of taxation ex-
ist? In particular, the early introductory states of the Northeast were afflicted with fiscal 
deficits. Many of the New England states had an inadequate fiscal system (Weinstein/
Deitch 1974). For example, New Hampshire had neither income nor value-added tax. 
More than half of all revenues resulted from consumption taxes. In addition, the New 
England states experienced an economic depression during the seventies, which was 
more profound than in the western or southern states (Wohlenberg 1992: 170). The 
second introductory wave increasingly affected more western states such as California, 
Colorado, and Washington, in which the fiscal situation was relatively stable. According 
to Wohlenberg (1992: 170), it was not only the actual economic situation that played 
a role in the introduction of lotteries, but also the anticipation of a possibly imminent 
“crisis.” The lottery was introduced not with the intention to rectify specific deficiencies, 
but to safeguard pre-emptively against a potential crisis. Wohlenberg’s thesis alludes to 
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an isomorphic adaptation process, as lotteries prevail as a legitimate model for generat-
ing tax, without the existence of actual demands. There are two verifiable hypotheses 
stemming from this discussion. 
H1a: States with fiscal deficits are more likely to introduce lotteries.
H1b: The connection between fiscal needs and the introduction of lotteries can be con-
firmed for the early lottery states, but not for the later ones. Over time, processes of 
institutional isomorphism lead to the adaptation of the lottery model, regardless of 
the fiscal situation.
Political factors: Lottery as a politically attractive tool
The second explanatory approach takes political factors into account. These factors in-
clude “innovation-friendly” government constellations as well as the general political 
appeal of lotteries. The introduction of a lottery is politically appealing as a form of 
taxation. Lotteries as a fiscal instrument have been described as painless tax (Clotfel-
ter/Cook 1991) – the state can increase revenues through lotteries without having to 
specifically introduce a new tax or increase existing taxes. The taxation character of 
lotteries is generally overlooked by the population. The generation of tax revenue can 
occur without loss of political sympathy. On the contrary: lotteries are popular, their in-
troduction can acquire votes (Filer/Moak/Uze 1988; Jackson/Saurman/Shughart 1994). 
Some lotteries in the United States were introduced by a referendum, which added to 
their political attractiveness (La Fleur/La Fleur 2006: 17). Not all U.S. states have this 
form of direct democracy. One hypothesis is that those states which allow for a referen-
dum have a higher probability of introduction. 
H2a: States that have a referendum as a means of direct democracy have a higher prob-
ability of introducing lotteries.
In addition, it can be presumed that states with more liberal than conservative govern-
ment majorities are more likely to implement a lottery. As indicated above, an intro-
duction requires a constitutional change to lift a gambling ban. Such a “radical” change 
is an innovation that may be less compatible with conservative, traditional ways of 
thinking (Mannheim [1925]1986). In addition, lottery players tend to come from the 
lower middle-class, which corresponds to the constituency of the Democrats (Brown/
Kaldenberg/Browne 1992). Further, liberals in the United States favor state intervention 
and higher taxes, while conservatives tend to favor lower taxes and less state interven-
tionism. Therefore, lotteries, which are also a means of taxation, would be ideologically 
welcome for the liberals. 
In accordance with the hypothesis of institutional isomorphism, the connection be-
tween state-interventionist ideology and lottery introduction is expected to be stronger 
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in the early phase of the diffusion process. The longer the diffusion process lasts, the 
more lotteries should be regarded as a legitimate means of national financing, even 
within the conservative spectrum. Moreover, it is plausible that in later phases liberal 
governments might oppose the introduction of lotteries, since they represent a regres-
sive form of taxation and indirectly contribute to the reinforcement of social inequali-
ties (Beckert/Lutter 2009). The establishment of lotteries leads to lottery-critical articles 
and scientific publications on the regressivity of lotteries, which in turn creates opposi-
tional opinions.2 From this, the following hypotheses are postulated.
H2b: In the early introductory phase, the government’s political ideology plays a role in 
explaining the diffusion of lotteries. State-interventionist ideologies have a positive 
effect on the probability on the introductory rate of lotteries. 
H2c: In later phases, the political ideology effect fades away because lotteries are taken for 
granted on all sides of the political spectrum.
Social factors: Religiously motivated gambling opposition
The third explanation attributes the introduction of lotteries to factors of normative 
legitimacy. These include changes in the social acceptance of gambling and the strength 
of the influence of fundamentalist Protestant religious groups, who are opposed to 
gambling. The change in the social acceptance of gambling in the United States can be 
explained by the establishment of other forms of gambling. Since the 1930s, the game 
‘Bingo’ began to become popular as a church event. In the early urban centers, illegal 
lottery markets were widespread (Light 1977; Devereux [1949]1980). At the beginning 
of the twentieth century, Las Vegas became the gambling center of the world. From this 
point on, gambling is regarded more as a legitimate leisure activity, even as a market, 
which serves tourism (casinos) and creates jobs, for example, in the hotel industry (Sal-
laz 2006; Chafetz 1960). 
This development triggered a trend to gradually end any moralization of gambling. 
However, in line with their beliefs and standards, conservative Protestant groups still 
objected to gambling. These groups were instrumental in the opposition movements, 
which resulted in the prohibition of lotteries in the mid-eighteenth century (Devereux 
[1949]1980; Findlay 1986). With the re-introduction of lotteries in the 1960s, these 
groups remained opposed to gambling. One of the largest U.S. conservative Protestant 
groups is the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC). Between 1938 and 1997, the SBC pub-
2 These studies find that lotteries pose a higher tax burden on the lower middle classes. The earli-
est studies on the regressivity were published in the mid–1970s and thus immediately following 
the first introductory wave (among the first studies are: Spiro 1974; Brinner/Clotfelter 1975; 
Clotfelter 1979). Curry (1996) is an example of a lottery-critical publication. Beckert and Lutter 
(2009) provide an overview on studies dealing with the regressivity of lotteries.
Lutter: The Adoption of Lotteries in the United States, 1964–2007 9
lished thirteen resolutions directed against gambling and lotteries.3 In a resolution from 
1985, it was stated: “Lotteries – like all forms of gambling – are socially, economically, 
and morally destructive, being rooted in greed and violating the biblical work ethic” 
(Southern Babtist Convention 1985). 
Evangelicals consider the Bible the written word of God, from which their gambling 
opposition is derived. Lotteries are thus thought to encourage sinful behavior, includ-
ing greed and avarice, the waste of resources, and risky, irresponsible behavior (Ellison/
Nybroten 1999: 358f.). Lotteries and gambling entice people to rely on chance and des-
tiny, instead of taking their luck “into their own hands.” Moreover, the drawing of lots 
is considered as a profanation of an otherwise sacred act, because “fortune” embodies 
God’s will; man, however, should be bound to work (Binde 2007). 
Protestant ethics proclaim the virtues of diligence, thriftiness, efficiency and profitabil-
ity, as well as productivity (Weber [1920]1988). From a work-ethic perspective, gam-
bling is a waste of time and money. The defining element of the emotional thrill of 
gambling that occurs when one bets on money undermines the Protestant values of 
self-discipline, prudence, and sober rationality. With gambling, the laws of cause and 
effect are switched off; only the principle of randomness is dominant. The player’s reli-
ance on chance moves gambling close to fatalism, superstition, and magic.
This leads to the hypothesis that states will more likely adopt a lottery if the structure of 
the population comprises of a smaller proportion of conservative Protestant denomi-
nations (Evangelists) as an indicator of gambling opposition. Conversely, the introduc-
tion is even more unlikely, the larger the proportion within the population is. In accor-
dance to a study published in 2008 in the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Policy, the 
percentage of Evangelicals in the U.S. population is approximated to be one-third, thus 
forming the largest group, followed by Catholics (23.9 percent) and moderate mainline 
Protestants (18.1 percent).4 The percentage of Evangelicals varies significantly in accor-
dance to region. While the numbers are often less than 15 percent in the northeastern 
states, over 50 percent has been recorded in southern states. 
H3:  The smaller the population of conservative Protestant denominations within a state, 
the greater is the probability that a lottery will be introduced.
Regional factors: Lottery diffusion across neighboring states
The diffusion of innovations via social networks or spatial proximity is one of the most 
important explanatory mechanisms of this area of research. Mohr (1969) argues that 
the spread of political innovations occurs over states with regional proximity. Shipan/
3 See all resolutions here: http://www.sbc.net/resolutions/default.asp (accessed March 17, 2011).
4 Compare with http://religions.pewforum.org (accessed March 17, 2011).
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Volden (2008: 842) claim that neighborhood effects are likely with economic spillovers. 
With lottery introductions, such a regional effect is presumed to exist amongst neigh-
boring states because of fiscal competition. The explanation is that the fear of losing tax 
revenue increases when a lottery is introduced in a neighboring state. If a state intro-
duces a lottery, it also publicizes this in neighboring states. In reaction to this, the con-
cerned neighbor state may move to introduce its own lottery, in order to exploit its own 
fiscal potential. Empirical evidence demonstrates that citizens from non-lottery states 
tend to buy tickets for neighboring state lotteries (Mikesell 1991). With the introduc-
tion of their own lottery, states therefore aim to prevent the exodus of potential revenue 
to adjacent state lotteries (Mikesell 1989; Mikesell/Zorn 1986; Stover 1990). 
However, the “mercantile” argument of revenue loss through adjacent lotteries is per-
haps less likely to be based on actual losses than on overrated collective ideas concerning 
potential revenue losses. Neighbor states are regarded as a model for the potentiality of 
a state’s own institutional arrangements (Meyer/Rowan 1977). The introduction of a 
lottery in the neighboring state exerts a form of institutional pressure on policy makers, 
which results in the introduction of a lottery. The political expectation is generated that 
if a state does not have its own lottery, it will miss out on tax revenues. Lotteries, there-
fore, are adopted through normative pressures (DiMaggio/Powell 1983). In this manner, 
the introduction can be explained by the theory of institutional isomorphism. Further-
more, it must be assumed that the diffusion effect on adjacent regional lotteries is depen-
dent on the number of surrounding neighbor states. The more neighbors a state has, the 
greater the institutional pressure to imitate is more likely to be. From this discussion, the 
following two hypotheses are derived.
H4a: With the rising number of neighboring state lotteries, the probability increases that 
a state will introduce a lottery.
H4b: The effect adjacent lotteries have on the introduction of a lottery increases with the 
number of  neighboring states.
These hypotheses unconditionally model a process of regional diffusion. Martin (2009a) 
suggests bringing the interdependent effects of political decisions in neighboring states 
in relation to the ideological position of a state. The study demonstrates for the case of 
cigarette taxation in the United States that the level of taxation in a state depends on the 
taxation level of its neighboring states, but that this regional effect is stronger for lib-
eral states than for conservative ones. Therefore, the success of a policy depends on the 
surrounding environment, which enables or prevents the diffusion process. In the case 
of lottery diffusion, it can be assumed that the regional diffusion effect is particularly 
effective when it encounters an appropriate political ideological environment. Liberal 
governments should endorse lottery introductions because of their more state-inter-
ventionist ideology. Therefore, the regional diffusion effect is particularly strong when 
it is enforced by a state-interventionist ideology. 
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H4c: The effect of adjacent lotteries on the probability of adoption varies with the state’s 
degree of government ideology. The effect should be strong for liberal governments 
and weak for conservative governments.
4 Empirical analysis
Data and methods
Event history modeling allows us to estimate the effects of both time-variant and time-
invariant covariates on the likelihood of the occurrence of a specific event (Blossfeld/
Hamerle/Mayer 1989; Box-Steffensmeier/Jones 2004). The event examined here is the in-
troduction of a state lottery in U.S. federal states for the period from 1964 to 2007. The 
parameter has the value 0 until a state introduces a lottery, then it receives the value 1. The 
data for the introduction of lotteries are taken from the World Lottery Almanac (La Fleur/
La Fleur 2006). All U.S. states, including Hawaii and Alaska, are the units of analysis. I 
employ probit models for discrete time data (Box-Steffensmeier/Jones 2004: 69ff.). To ac-
count for duration dependence (Beck/Katz/Tucker 1998), all models include time (mea-
sured in years) and rely on Hubert/White robust standard errors with clustering by state 
to account for problems of heteroscedasticity and non-independence of observations.5
In order to analyze changes over time in the proposed effects, I examine two strategies. 
First, I divide the diffusion period into three significant episodes: an “early,” a “middle,” 
and a “late” adoption phase. I then estimate the specified probit model for each epi-
sode separately. The three phases are defined in accordance with the discussion in the 
second section. The early phase covers the period from 1964 to 1974, and represents 
the pioneering phase of lottery introductions. During this period, eleven northeastern 
states introduced lotteries. The second time interval refers to the period between 1975 
and 1984, during which a total of ten mostly western or northwestern states introduced 
a lottery. The third and final period includes the late introductory wave between 1985 
and 2007. During that period, twenty-three states established lotteries, most of which 
were in the South or the Midwest. This approach makes it possible to recognize tem-
poral changes in model coefficients between the periods. However, it requires that “sig-
nificant” time intervals are chosen a priori, so that they can represent the hypothesized 
form of temporal change. Therefore, in a second specification, I specify interaction ef-
fects between the duration variable and the substantive predictors. By depicting the en-
tire range of values of these temporal interaction effects in a diagram, the time-related 
hypotheses can be analyzed in detail.
5 This approach to panel data is common sense, as diffusion studies from other areas show (Shi-
pan/Volden 2006: 832; Brooks 2007: 710; Soule 2004: 466; Barclay/Fisher 2003: 346). Alternative 
specifications and sensitive analyses including logit and Cox models were explored prior to this 
analysis. Results revealed no substantive differences to the findings presented below.
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Predictors
Table 1 shows the predictors that were used in this study. The data has been taken from 
multiple sources, including statistical archives (e.g. the U.S. Census Bureau or the Sta-
tistical Abstracts of the United States), my own calculations, and other literature (Berry/
Berry 1990; Berry et al. 1998; Breunig/Koski 2009). To test the hypotheses 1a and 1b, 
which associate the introduction of lotteries with the fiscal requirements of a state, an 
indicator will be used that provides information on the fiscal situation of a state at the 
time point t. This indicator is calculated from the difference between total state revenue 
and total state spending, divided by total state spending. The index has been lagged by 
one year in order to correct for simultaneity bias, meaning the revenue from recently 
established lotteries that flows into the calculation of the index and thus distorts the re-
sults of the analysis. The indicator takes on positive values in the case of fiscal surpluses 
and negative values with fiscal deficits. 
Political factors are operationalized by a parameter that measures whether a referen-
dum exists in a state as means of direct democracy through which lotteries may be 
introduced. Furthermore, I use an index which provides information on the level of 
political liberalism of the government for all states. This one-dimensional index stems 
from Berry et al. (1998) and captures the political and ideological orientation of the 
governor, the two major parties, and the state legislatures for each year between 1960 
and 2008.6 It measures the political ideology of a state in which several indicators are 
weighed together (this includes, in addition to the party affiliation of the governor, the 
ideological orientation of all members of Congress measured on the basis of various 
indicators or on estimates by lobby groups). Thus, it embraces the special ideological 
structure of the United States in which the same party label can have rather different 
meaning in different states and at different times. The range of values of this index lies 
between 0 (most conservative) to 100 (most liberal). 
Hypothesis 3 postulates influences of religiously motivated opposition to gambling. In 
order to test this, I use the percentage of the population which stands in the evangeli-
cal, conservative tradition of Protestantism. This information stems from U.S. Religion 
Landscape Survey of the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Policy.7 
To test the hypotheses 4a to 4c, two indicators are specified: the number of directly ad-
jacent states and the total number of established neighboring lotteries at time t. I have 
constructed an interaction term between both parameters on the basis of the assump-
tion that the probability of adoption increases as the number of directly adjacent states 
rises. To investigate the proposed conditional effect of region and ideology, an interac-
6 This is the latest version of the index which was updated in August 2010. The index and addi-
tional information can be accessed at http://www.uky.edu/~rford/stateideology.html (accessed 
March 17, 2011).
7 See the website http://religions.pewforum.org/affiliations (accessed March 17, 2011) for infor-
mation on the methodology of this indicator.
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tion term between the number of neighboring state lotteries and the political ideology 
of a federal state is specified. The assumption is that the influence of the regional sur-
roundings on the spread of lotteries varies with the political ideology of a state. 
In addition, in every model the impact of legalized gambling in the casino industry is 
examined in order to control for the importance of this sector and its lobby groups. For 
this, a measure is included which counts the number of operated, state-licensed casinos 
for each state. Since lottery introductions also depend on the population size, all models 
control the number of residents per state. All indicators, with which interaction terms 
are modeled, are centered at their mean for the analysis. In addition, I specify several 
predictors in a squared relationship, in order to achieve a better model fit.
Results
Table 2 presents the results of the estimated probit models. The first column shows the 
baseline model; it covers all substantive characteristics and control variables. Model 2 
additionally contains the interaction terms to investigate the conditional regional dif-
Table 1 Origin and descriptives of the model predictors
Predictor Mean Std.dev. Minimum Maximum Origin
Fiscal surplus, t–1, 
1963–2006
–0.048 0.129 –0.630 1.248 Berry & Berry (1990); 
Statistical 
Abstracts of the United 
States
Government Ideology 
(100 = liberal; 
0 = conservative), 
1964–2007
45.14 22.519 0 97.218 Berry et al. (1998);
http://www.uky.
edu/~rford/stateideology.
html (accessed March 17, 
2011)
Referendum (1 = yes) 0.474 0.499 0 1 Breunig & Koski (2009)
% of evangelical  
Protestants, 2007
32.843 13.365 10 65 U.S. Religion Landscapes 
Survey; http://religions.
pewforum.org (accessed 
March 17, 2011)
No. of bordering states 4.223 1.880 0 8 Own calculation
No. of neighboring 
lotteries, at time t, 
1964–2007
0.871 1.361 0 5 Own calculation
Population in 1000s, 
1964–2007
3766.594 3907.013 370 25776 Statistical Abstracts of 
the United States
No. of casinos, 2007 37.783 74.992 0 369 http://us.casinocity.com 
(accessed March 17, 
2011)
Duration, in years,  
1964–2007
16.215 11.233 1 44 Own calculation
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fusion processes. Both model specifications refer to the entire diffusion period (1964–
2007). In order to analyze the direction and validity of the postulated time-varying 
effects, the above-mentioned time episodes – an early or pioneer period, a middle pe-
riod, and a late period – are examined in columns 3 to 5. Model 6 finally estimates the 
temporal change by the specification of interaction terms. Here, the duration of the dif-
fusion process is interacted with the substantial variables: fiscal surplus, political ideol-
ogy, share of the evangelical population, and the number of neighboring state lotteries.
Hypothesis 1a tests fiscal-economic causes of the introduction of lotteries. As can be 
observed in Table 2, such a correlation is clearly recognizable. The inclusion of the en-
tire period in the first two models results in a statistically significant point estimate, 
indicating that states with lower fiscal conditions are more willing to introduce lotteries. 
Moreover, an inverse U-shaped relationship can be presumed because of the significant 
negative quadratic term. This result clearly speaks for the argument that the higher 
the fiscal surplus, the more rapidly the probability of adopting decreases. This finding, 
however, does not reveal anything about the time dependency of this parameter pos-
tulated by hypothesis 1b, but refers to the general trend for the entire period. The time 
dynamic can be noticed in the following columns 3 to 5. From these results, it becomes 
clear that that the fiscal situation of a state is primarily relevant due to the initial intro-
duction of lotteries, and affects less strongly the introduction at later stages. During the 
early phase, the effect is particularly pronounced (see Model 3) and loses its conciseness 
in the middle and late phases. The time-dependent interaction in Model 6 confirms the 
hypothesis that the progressive introduction of lotteries is entirely independent of the 
fiscal situation of a state.
The change in effect over time can be observed in Figure 2. The y-axis represents point 
estimates of the regression coefficients from Model 6 for fiscal surplus as a function of 
the duration of the diffusion process since 1964 (x-axis). The figure also shows the upper 
and lower limit of the 95 percent confidence interval. When the interval range lies out-
side of the zero line, the coefficient is significant at 95 percent. The results demonstrate 
that a negative significant effect exists at the beginning of the diffusion process – fiscal 
deficit affects the introduction – while in later stages the effect becomes insignificant. 
Lotteries are then introduced independently of the fiscal-economic situation of a state.
With regard to the second approach, which postulates the influence of liberal or conser-
vative government ideology on lottery introductions, the findings support the plausibil-
ity of the assumptions. The results indicate a positive, significant influence in favor of 
an ideologically liberal government. If one looks at the individual periods, liberal states 
exhibit a higher introduction chance in the early phase, while in the middle and late 
phases, the ideology no longer corresponds with introduction. The upper right panel in 
Figure 2 demonstrates the change of the effect over time and shows that the ideological 
influence at the beginning of the diffusion process is statistically significant and de-
creases with increasing duration. After approximately fifteen years, the liberal ideology 
no longer affects the introduction of lotteries. 
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Table 2 Determinants of lottery diffusion, 1964–2007
Model 1
1964–2007
Model 2
1964–2007
Model 3
Period I
1964–1974
Model 4
Period II
1975–1984
Model 5
Period III
1985–2007
Model 6
1964–2007
Fiscal surplus –2.413*** –2.342*** –24.293** –5.808* –1.790 –3.659***
(–2.804) (–2.853) (–2.439) (–1.766) (–1.484) (–3.238)
Fiscal surplus –8.265** –8.208** –113.524** –9.346 –6.852*** –19.392**
   (squ) (–2.118) (–2.016) (–2.351) (–0.595) (–2.585) (–2.553)
Ideology 0.012** 0.008 0.022*** 0.007 0.009 0.012*
(2.306) (1.349) (2.586) (0.547) (1.187) (1.841)
Ideology –0.000*** –0.001*** –0.001* –0.001 –0.000 –0.001***
   (squ) (–2.681) (–2.759) (–1.777) (–1.311) (–1.291) (–3.050)
Referendum 0.183 0.244 –0.211 1.860*** 0.070 0.223
(1.025) (1.355) (–0.822) (4.049) (0.197) (1.289)
% Evangelical 
Protestants
–0.051***
(–5.200)
–0.054***
(–4.771)
–0.106***
(–4.483)
–0.061***
(–3.213)
–0.053***
(–2.820)
–0.054***
(–4.880)
No. of bordering states 0.109** 0.102** –0.098 –0.019 0.237* 0.103**
(2.381) (2.161) (–1.128) (–0.150) (1.916) (2.247)
No. of neighboring 
Lotteries
0.280** 
(2.556)
0.233** 
(2.122)
–0.617*
(–1.727)
0.266 
(0.704)
0.082 
(0.418)
0.165 
(1.228)
No. of neighboring 
lotteries (squ)
–0.084*
(–1.880)
–0.089*
(–1.658)
–0.089
(–0.548)
0.405 
(1.525)
–0.057
(–0.906)
–0.128*
(–1.703)
Population 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000 0.000*** 0.000***
(3.046) (3.027) (1.829) (0.957) (2.579) (3.025)
No. of casinos –0.003*** –0.003*** –0.027*** –0.006** –0.001 –0.003***
(–3.394) (–3.435) (–3.094) (–2.401) (–1.000) (–2.954)
Duration 0.063*** 0.066*** 0.377* 0.253** 0.052** 0.072***
(5.421) (5.433) (1.789) (2.024) (2.032) (5.252)
Interaction terms
No. of neighboring 
lotteries * No. of 
bordering states
0.011 
(0.340)
0.033 
(0.843)
No. of neighboring 
lotteries * Ideology
0.007** 
(2.287)
0.011**
(2.542)
Duration * Fiscal surplus 0.175**
(1.969)
Duration * Ideology –0.001
(–1.320)
Duration * % of 
evangelical Protestants
–0.001
(–0.837)
Duration * No. of 
neighboring lotteries
0.008 
(1.060)
Constant –2.122*** –2.154*** –1.371 –4.190*** –1.998*** –2.109***
(–12.590) (–13.160) (–1.560) (–3.784) (–4.968) (–12.453)
Wald Chi2 106.05 137.58 103.05 90.26 36.58 206.87
P > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
No. of States 50 50 50 39 29 50
No. of Events 44 44 11 10 23 44
No. of Obs. 1,255 1,255 523 367 365 1,255
Notes: Discrete-time models (probit) using robust standard errors; t statistics in parentheses;  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 (two-sided tests).
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The third approach is based on normative and religious factors as an explanation of 
lottery adoption. Again, the relationship can be clearly confirmed by the model esti-
mates. The proportion of evangelical Protestants for each state has a significant negative 
impact on the introduction of lotteries. This applies to all model specifications, both 
for the main models and for all individual periods. Analysis of the time-dependent 
interaction demonstrates (see the diagram at the bottom left-hand panel in Figure 2) 
that religious opposition is becoming more relevant as time passes. The religious factor 
is thus one of the most important variables in explaining lottery introductions; evan-
gelical Protestantism, as a normative opposition factor, exerts a decisive influence on 
the regulation of state lotteries in the United States and prevents the introduction of 
lotteries even when they are beginning to be regarded as a legitimate model elsewhere.
The fourth approach attributes the introduction of lotteries to the regional context. 
The number of already established lotteries in the proximity of a state should increase 
the probability of adoption. This effect proves to be significant in the main model: the 
more lottery states border on a regional level, the greater the likelihood of introduction. 
The temporal change of the coefficient, however, demonstrates no significant range of 
values (see Figure 2), whereby a slight increase in the absolute numerical value of the 
coefficients can be observed.
0 10 20 30 40
1
0.5
0
–0.5
No. of neighboring lotteries
0 10 20 30 40
0
–0.05
–0.1
% of evangelical Protestants
IdeologyFiscal surplus
5
0
–5
–10
0.04
0.02
0
–0.02
Duration in years
Effect on lottery diffusion
95% confidence interval
Figure 2 Interaction with time: Effect of fiscal surplus, ideology, % of evangelical  
 Protestants and no. of neighboring lotteries on lottery diffusion for  
 values of time, with 95% confidence interval (Model 6)
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Figure 3 presents a representation of the specified interaction terms for the analysis of 
the proposed conditional diffusion processes. The first diagram illustrates the effect of 
regional lotteries on the diffusion process depending on the total number of directly 
neighboring states. It can thereby be observed that the effect of regional lotteries is 
particularly effective when the absolute number of adjacent neighbor states is high, 
whereby the effects for states which have between approximately three and seven neigh-
boring borders is statistically significant. This argues for institutional pressures, which 
existing lotteries exert on neighborhood states and which are higher if a state has many 
neighboring lotteries. 
The second diagram demonstrates the change in the impact of regional lotteries on 
the probability of adoption for the range of values of the interacting ideological posi-
tion of a state. As can be seen from the diagram, the regional diffusion effect becomes 
considerably stronger the more liberal the ideological position of a state is. Therefore, 
regional diffusion effects are dependent on the political ideology of a state. While the 
effect is weak for states in the conservative ideological spectrum, it is significant for 
states with liberal, tax-favored ideological positions. The institutional pressure exerted 
by the neighboring states can therefore only be of practical consequence when meet-
ing a favorable ideological environment. If it encounters a rather conservative position, 
adjacent regional lotteries do not have any influence. 
1
0.5
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–0.5
0 50 100
IdeologyNo. of borders
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
–0.2
0 2 4 6 8
(1) (2)
Figure 3 Conditional regional diffusion: Effect of neighboring lotteries on the  
 diffusion process for values of no. of bordering states and ideology,  
 with 95% confidence interval (Model 2)
Regional effect on lottery diffusion
95% confidence interval
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5 Conclusion
This article has aimed to elucidate the patterns of the introduction and spread of state 
lotteries in the United States since the 1960s. To examine the discussed hypotheses, 
event history modeling was employed, using data that covered states in the period from 
1964 to 2007. The results of the model estimates confirm the proposed approaches. 
With regard to the analysis of the temporal change in the effects, the findings demon-
strate that different factors are dominant in explaining lottery adoptions in different 
phases of the diffusion process. Fiscal and political factors played an important role in 
the early phases of the diffusion process. In later phases, lotteries are increasingly intro-
duced independently of these. The article explains this development with sociological 
neoinstitutionalism: as the number of established lotteries increases, they gain legiti-
mation as an appropriate cultural model, which yields into a process of institutional 
isomorphism.
The second important finding of this paper focuses on an extension of current explana-
tions of diffusion processes through regional factors. Here, the regional diffusion effect 
was analyzed conditional on the government ideology of a state, in order to capture 
a more exact understanding of how a regional diffusion effect evolves. The analysis 
showed that the effect of adjacent states is particularly high when it interacts with liberal 
political ideologies, while politically conservative environments do not exhibit a signifi-
cant regional effect. The influence of the regional context on diffusion thus depends 
on the ideological order of a state, which enables or prevents the innovation to diffuse. 
One of the most statistically important effects was the oppositional influence of religious 
beliefs, which was measured here as a proportion of conservative Protestant groups per 
state. The negative correlation between evangelical Protestantism and lotteries is con-
sistent with the discussion on the relationship between gambling and Protestant ethics 
(Lutter 2010; Cosgrave/Klassen 2001; Ellison/Nybroten 1999; Murrell 1979). This dem-
onstrates the enormous importance of (evangelical) Protestantism as an oppositional 
and prohibiting factor. 
The findings from this analysis generally point to the influence of normative structures 
on the political regulation of economic processes. If the exchange processes carried out 
on markets are not consistent with the predominating values and norms of society, 
markets are then socially prevented (Healy 2006; Zelizer 1979; Beckert 2006). If lotter-
ies remain banned today despite their fiscal attractiveness, this points to value-rational 
motives as a structuring force of modern society. The longer the diffusion process con-
tinues, the more statistically relevant this effect becomes. 
However, religious opposition is not completely able to prevent the spread of lotteries. 
Eighty-four percent of all states currently operate a state lottery, meaning that 94 per-
cent of the entire U.S. population lives in a lottery state. Following a ban of more than 
one hundred years, lotteries have today become a legitimate state institution, whose 
Lutter: The Adoption of Lotteries in the United States, 1964–2007 19
introduction no longer requires coupling to a specific fiscal economic situation. Pro-
cesses of isomorphism have produced a legitimate mode of organization, which even 
gets adopted by states with high levels of religious opposition.
To conclude, the analysis presented here aims to provide a more complex approach to 
the understanding of diffusion processes within social systems by focusing on lotteries 
as a form of a political and organizational innovation. A particular focus has been given 
to temporal dynamics, meaning the change in the causes of the diffusion process over 
time, and the modeling of a regional diffusion that is structured by ideological order. 
With these two expanded perspectives on the diffusion of political and organizational 
innovations, this paper demonstrates an approach that can also be applied to other ar-
eas beyond the empirical object studied here.
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